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Abstract. During recent years with the increase of data and data anal-
ysis needs, privacy preserving data analysis methods have become of
great importance. Researchers have proposed different methods for this
purpose. Secure multi-party computation is one of such techniques that
allows a group of parties to evaluate a function on their data without
revealing the data. This is done by secret sharing approach, in which
parties share a piece of their data using polynomials and after doing
function evaluation on shares of data finally they do a Lagrange inter-
polation to get the result. Two approaches have been proposed in secure
multi-party computation for evaluating a function, arithmetic gates and
logical gates. In both of them and since communication is an important
step in multi-party computation, errors may happen. So, being able to
detect and correct errors is important. Moreover, as adversaries may in-
terrupt communication or manipulate the data, either in communication
or during computation, this error detection and correction provide par-
ticipating parties with a technique to detect such errors. Hence, in this
paper we present a secure multi-party computation error correcting tech-
nique that has the ability to detect and correct errors on players shares.
This technique is based on Berlekamp-Welch error correcting codes and
we assume that players shares are generated using Reed-Solomon codes.
Keywords: multi-party computation, error correcting codes, Reed-Solomon
codes, Berlekamp-Welch algorithm
1 Introduction
During recent years, the increase of data on one hand and the importance of
privacy of them on the other hand, encouraged researchers to work on tech-
niques that allow data holders to do data analysis techniques without revealing
private data. One of such techniques is secure multi-party computation. Secure
multi-party computation is a kind of distributed computation that allow a set of
parties to compute a function on their private data, without revealing them. The
idea was first introduced by Yao, in his Millionarie’s problem [1]. The problem
says two millionaries want to know who is richer, but they do not want to reveal
their wealth. After Yao’s seminal paper, many researches have been done in this
direction and his idea was generalized to a general purpose form. Specifically,
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researchers focused on how they can evaluate a function on n piece of data,
holding by n parties, without revealing the data. It has been shown that any
function can be computed in on such data without revealing them. Two general
approaches have been proposed, using binary circuits or using arithmetic cir-
cuits. In the first case, n parties share their data among themselves, using for
example Shamir’s secret sharing [2] and then the parties do function calculation
using binary circuits on the shared data. In this approach, parties do bit-wise
calculation using for example Oblivious Transfer. As communication is an in-
separable part of multi-party computation, because parties are constantly send
and receive data, this approach is not efficient from communication complexity
point of view. In the arithmetic circuit scenario, the parties use secret sharing
to share their data and do function evaluation on them. As this idea is based on
polynomials and finite field calculation, it is more efficient.
In both scenarios all parties need to communicate and share their data. On the
other hand adversaries may interrupt data communication, or create noise while
players are doing local calculation on their data. As such, if they have the ability
to use an error detection and correction technique, they can increase the reli-
ability of the protocol they use for multi-party computation. In this paper we
propose a secure error correction technique that can be added to a secure multi-
party computation for detecting errors created by adversaries or communication
channels. The idea is based on Berlekamp-Welch algorithm and we assume par-
ties have created their shares based on Reed-Solomon codes. The reason that
we use these two specific techniques is that, as secret sharing, they are based on
polynomials over finite fields which are efficient for implementation.
The paper organization is as follows. First we presents the preliminaries of our
work, including multi-party computation, Reed-Solomon codes and their decod-
ing using Berlekamp-Welch algorithm. Then the previous works will be reviewed.
After that the main part of this paper will be presented.
2 Preliminaries
In this section we present the preliminaries our our work. These include multi-
party comutation, Reed-Solomon codes (we call them RS codes for simplicity),
Berlekamp-Welch decoding algorithm (we call it BW algorithm for simplicity)
for RS codes.
2.1 Secure Multi Party Computation
Secure multi-party computation which its first idea was introduced by Yao [1] is
defined as follows. n parties each have a private value, want to evaluate a public
function on their private data in such a way that they don’t reveal any informa-
tion about their data but they all can get the output of the public function. One
simple example is that n parties have n integer values and they want to find the
maximum of them without revealing them.
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Many researches have been done in this area [4], [5], [8], [7], [6]. In secure multi-
party computation two approaches can be used. One approach is doing computa-
tion based on bits of shared values and the other approach is doing computation
based on shared values of secrets in a finite field Zp, for a prime integer p, [4].
In both cases the shares of secret values are being distributed using a secret
sharing scheme, such as Shamir secret sharing [2]. However, both approaches
have their own pros and cons, for example, doing addition and multiplication is
efficient in finite field arithmetic, but using boolean circuits it is not efficient.
Unfortunately, doing calculations such as secret comparisons is not efficient and
trivial in arithmetic circuits, whereas it is trivial in boolean circuit calculations
[4]. However, for large integers this task is not efficient using boolean circuits.
To overcome the inefficiency of these two scenarios and having an efficient in
[5] authors presented a protocol, called bit-decomposition, that allows parties to
convert sharing of finite field elements to sharing of bits. In [4] authors improved
the bit-decomposition protocol by reducing its communication complexity. An-
other work in this area has been presented in [9] which is based on threshold
homomorphic systems.
2.2 Reed-Solomon Codes
Reed-Solomon codes was introduced in 1960 in [10]. These linear error-correcting
codes are based on polynomials over finite fields and have many applications. In
the following we assume all calculation are done in the finite field Zp for a given
prime number p. RS codes encode a message of length k into a codeword of length
n, k ≤ n ≤ p. Mathematically, given a message m = [m0,m1,m2, ...,mk−1], the
polynomial P is defined as following:
P (x) = m0 +m1x+m2x
2 + ...+mk−1x
k−1 (1)
In which coefficients are in Zp. To encode the message m, the polynomial will be
evaluated on n different points, say 1, 2, ..., n, so the encoded message, denoted
by c would be:
c = [c0, c1, c2, ...,cn−1] = [P (1), P (2), P (3), ..., P (n)] (2)
For the Reed-Solomon codes we have the following theorems:
Theorem 1. The weight of Reed-Solomon codes of length n with a message of
length k, RS(n, k), is n− k + 1.
Theorem 2. An RS(n, k) with n = k + 2e can correct e errors.
A decoding algorithm was developed by Berlekamp and Welch in [11], which
we will discuss it in the next section.
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2.3 Berlekamp-Welch Decoding Algorithm
Berlekamp-Welch algorithm is a decoding algorithm for RS codes [11]. As we
discussed in the previous section, an RS(n, k) code encodes a message with
length k to a codeword of length n. Now, assume that e errors has happened
in the codeword c = [c0, c1, c2, ...,cn−1] = [P (1), P (2), P (3), ..., P (n)] and the
codeword with error is r = [r0, r1, r2, ...,rn−1]. That is, ri 6= P (i) for at most e
cases.
Theorem 3. Given a received codeword, generated by RS(n, k) codes, with e
errors, then there exists non-zero polynomials E(x) and Q(x) for which we have
[12]:
degree(E(x)) ≤ e (3)
degree(Q(x)) ≤ m+ e− 1 (4)
Q(i) = riE(i) ∀i = 1, 2, ..., n. (5)
Moreover, Q(x)
E(x) will give the polynomial that has generated the codeword, P (x).
Equation 5 is called key equation and solving it gives us the location of the errors
in the received codeword, which is guaranteed by theorem 3.
For i = 1, 2, ..., n, key equation, equation 5, will produce a linear system of
equations, which we can solve it by different methods in linear algebra, such as
Gaussian elimination or Cramer’s rule. By finding the solution of key equation,
we can find errors location and the polynomial P which gives the corrected
message.
3 Secure Error Detection and Correction using MPC
We assume that n parties have n shares and they want to be able to check if any
errors has happened in their data, because in multy-party computation parties
constantly exchange their data. We also assume that all the following calcula-
tions are done in finite field Zp where p is a prime number.
In order to be able to detect and correct e errors, we need to have at least 3e+1
shares, in other words 3e + 1 parties need to participate, because according to
theorem 2, n ≥ k + 2e, which k is the message length. Also, we assume that
the number of errors at most can be one less than the message length. In other
words, all the message has not been altered. In the following we will address the
problem of error detection and then provide a technique that allows the parties
to recover the incorrect share.
Locating one error at the time: Each player creates an equation using his
secret value (which is denoted by αi for player i).
a0 + a1x+ a2x
2 + ...+ an−3x
n−3 + an−2x
n−2 = αi(x+ b0) (6)
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So we have n equations, each at hand of one party, by which we can define
the following system linear equation (consisting of n equations and n unknowns
including a0, a1, a2, ..., an−2, b0).


a0 + a1x+ a2x
2 + ...+ an−3x
n−3 + an−2x
n−2 = α1(x+ b0)
a0 + a1x+ a2x
2 + ...+ an−3x
n−3 + an−2x
n−2 = α2(x+ b0)
...
a0 + a1x+ a2x
2 + ...+ an−3x
n−3 + an−2x
n−2 = αn(x+ b0)
(7)
a0, a1, a2, ..., an−2 will be used for the error correction polynomial Q in BW al-
gorithm and b0 is error locator as the E polynomial in BW algorithm. Also we
assume that all of calculations are done in Zp for a public pre-defined prime num-
ber p. Now, players evaluate equations with x = 1, 2, 3, ..., n, like BW algorithm.
So, they have:


a0 + a1 + a2 + ...+ an−3 + an−2 = α1(1 + b0)
a0 + 2a1 + 4a2 + ...+ 2
n−3an−3 + 2
n−2an−2 = α2(2 + b0)
...
a0 + na1 + n
2a2 + ...+ n
n−3an−3 + n
n−2an−2 = αn(n+ b0)
(8)
To make it simple, we use matrix notation to show this linear system of equations:


1 1 1 . . . 1n−2 −α1
1 2 4 . . . 2n−2 −α2
1 3 9 . . . 3n−2 −α3
...
...
...
. . .
...
...
1 n− 1 (n− 1)
2
. . . (n− 1)n−2 −αn−1
1 n n2 . . . nn−2 −αn




a0
a1
a2
...
an−2
b0


=


α1
2α2
3α3
...
(n− 1)αn−1
nαn


(9)
The first n− 2 columns of the first matrix are public values, which are the same
as the columns of the Vandermone matrix. If we use Cramer’s rule for solving
this system of equations (just for b0, which determines the location of the error),
we would have:
b0 =
det(A1)
det(A2)
(10)
where
A1 =


1 1 1 . . . 1n−2 α1
1 2 4 . . . 2n−2 2α2
1 3 9 . . . 3n−2 3α3
...
...
...
. . .
...
...
1 n− 1 (n− 1)
2
. . . (n− 1)n−2 (n− 1)αn−1
1 n n2 . . . nn−2 nαn


(11)
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and
A2 =


1 1 1 . . . 1n−2 −α1
1 2 4 . . . 2n−2 −α2
1 3 9 . . . 3n−2 −α3
...
...
...
. . .
...
...
1 n− 1 (n− 1)2 . . . (n− 1)n−2 −αn−1
1 n n2 . . . nn−2 −αn


(12)
if we expand the determinant based on the last column, we will have:
d1 = det(A1) =
n∑
i=1
(−1)i+n(−αi)det(A
i,n
1 ) (13)
and
d2 = det(A2) =
n∑
i=1
(−1)i+n(αi)det(A
i,n
2 ) (14)
where Ai,n is the (n − 1) × (n − 1) matrix that is created by eliminating the
i-th row and n-th column of A. As we see in the above equation just αi’s are
secret and the second term in the summation is a public value. So, to calculate
d1 and d2, players just need to locally multiply their secret value by a public
term and send a shares of the result to other players and finally do a Lagrange
interpolation to find the location of the error. The error detection algorithm is
as following, see algorithm 1.
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Algorithm 1 Error Detection Protocol
1: Each player defines his own equation (with his public ID i and his secret value αi),
as following:
Q(i) = αiE(i) (15)
2: All players put their public part of their equation in a matrix (in the last column
which is private value of each player they just put ∗, because in the next step during
Gaussian expansion, this will be eliminated) as follows:
A =


1 1 1 . . . 1n−2 ∗
1 2 4 . . . 2n−2 ∗
1 3 9 . . . 3n−2 ∗
...
...
...
. . .
...
...
1 n− 1 (n− 1)2 . . . (n− 1)n−2 ∗
1 n n2 . . . nn−2 ∗


(16)
3: One of the players accepts to calculate det(Ai,n
1
) and det(Ai,n
2
), from A matrix. Ai,n
means the (n− 1) by (b− 1) matrix that has been created from A by eliminating
its i-th row and n-th column. After calculation this player hands out det(Ai,n
1
) and
det(Ai,n
2
) to player with ID i.
4: Now, each player, which just received his related terms in equations 13 and 14,
calculate the multiplication of his private value by the received term locally, we
call the result value deti for player i.
5: Each player, shares his deti between all players.
6: Each player adds up his received shares, lets denote the result by si, that is si =∑n
j=1
detj .
7: Finally all players do a Lagrange interpolation on their si and get the d1 and d2,
as in equation 10. Note that for d1 and d2 players need to multiply their private
values with the corresponding terms as in equations 13 and 14.
Correcting one error at a time: For the error correction we will use the
idea in [13]. In this paper authors proposed a new approach, based on Lagrange
interpolation, for recovering incorrect shares. After the location of error has
been determined, solving the system of equations for b0, the other parties who
have correct shares, help the party with incorrect share to correct his share. The
whole idea is that each player calculates his Lagrange interpolation constant and
multiplies it by his share and send the shares of the result value to all players.
After all players do so, they will have portions of a share of the original data, by
which the player with incorrect share can correct his share. The error correction
protocol 2 shows the step by step process for helping a player to correct his
share.
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Algorithm 2 Error Correction Protocol
1: Each party i calculates his Lagrange interpolation constant as following:
γi =
∏
1≤j≤t,i6=j
(
k − j
i− j
) (17)
2: Then each player multiplies his secret value αi by his Lagrange interpolation con-
stant γi and splits it into t portions, where t is threshold in secret sharing.
αi × γi = δ1i + δ2i + . . . δti. (18)
Next, he sends each portion to one of t players.
3: Each party j receives t portions in total and adds them up as follows:
σj =
t∑
i=1
δji. (19)
which δji means the portion that participant i has sent to participant j.
4: Party j then sends σj to party, say with ID k, whose share is corrupted or altered.
t players need to send their share for player k, so he will be able to recover his
correct share.
5: Party k adds up all the t received shares, from helper players, the result is his
recovered share:
α
corrected
k =
t∑
j=1
σj . (20)
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4 Technical Discussion
In this section we will discuss the security analysis as well as computational and
communication complexity of the error detection and correction protocols.
4.1 Security Analysis of Error Dectection Protocol
Similar to (t, n)-threshold secret sharing, in which a group of t players need to
cooperate in order to get the secret value, here in this secure error correction
protocol t players need to come together to detect and correct an error. To do
so, they create a asystem of linear equations and when they represent it in the
matrix format, Ax = b, one column of the A matrix and the b vector consist of
secret values of players. As they calculate the determinant of the matrix using
Gaussian expansion based on the column containing the secret values, the new
sub-matrices are all containing public values, which their determinant will be
calculated and distributed among all players by a volunteer player. Then each
player needs to caclulate a multiplication by a public value localy which can
be calculated easily by each player without revealing any information, , see
equations 13 and 14 and the toy example in appendix A.
4.2 Round Complexity Discussion
Communication or round complexity, which can very large in some MPC pro-
tocol, for our secure error correction protocol is very small. For error detection
players calculate two determinants (d1 according to the equation 13 and d2 ac-
cording to the equation 14) in which they only do multiplication by some public
values, which can be easily done and does not need any multiplication in MPC
which requrires sharing and resharing. After that they do a Lagrange interpola-
tion collaboratively.
For error correction, one round of communication is needed in step 2 and one
round in step 3, in totall two round of communication.
4.3 Computational Complexity Discussion
The computational complexity of error correction algorithm is O(n3) where n
is the number of players. Because a volunteer player calculates the determinant
of (n − 1) by (n − 1) matrices which can be done in O(n3), or by using more
efficient algorithms in a lower time complexity. The Lagrange interpolation can
be done in O(n2).
5 Conclusion
In this paper we introduced the idea of secure error correction that allows a group
of parties to detect and correct their shares in a privacy-preserving manner. The
idea is based on Reed-Solomon codes and Berlekamp-Welch decoding algorithm.
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In fact we used Berlekamp-Welch algorithm for finding the location of the errors
and for error correction we used the assumption of Shamir’s (t, n)-threshold
Secret Sharing, that a group of t parties have enough data to recover the secret
or equivalently create the share of a specific party. The protocol works as follows.
At any point in an MPC protocol, players can collaboratively form the system
of equations in BW algorithm and then solve it. Note that each equation is at
the hand of one player. Then they expand the determinant of the matrix of
their system of equations using the Laplace expansion and they calculate and
announce the determinant of the sub-matrices if there is no secret value in any
column. After doing calculation and finding the location of the error, which is
the ID of a player, any subset of t of players with correct share can help the
player with incorrect share to recover his correct share (t is threshold in the
Shamir’s (t, n)-threshold secret sharing).
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Appendix: A Toy Example
A toy example: Assume that the prime p = 7 and players ID are 1, 2, 3, 4. Also
the private values of four parties are 2, 0, 5, 3 and the third value has changed to
4 because of an error. So, the codeword is [c0, c1, c2, c3] = [2, 0, 5, 3] and the re-
ceived vector, as described in BW algorithm, is [r0, r1, r2, r3] = [α0, α1, α2, α3] =
[2, 0, 4, 3]. The key equation of BW algorithm would be
a0 + a1x+ a2x
2 = αi(x+ b0) (21)
Evaluating it for x = 1, 2, 3, 4 (here each x is the ID of a player and each equation
is at the hand of one player):


a0 + a1 + a2 = 2(1 + b0)
a0 + 2a1 + 4a2 = 0(2 + b0)
a0 + 3a1 + 2a2 = 4(3 + b0)
a0 + 4a1 + 2a2 = 3(4 + b0)
(22)
In fact each player create his equation using his ID which is a public value. This
system of equations can be written as, after doing all calculation in Z7:

a0 + a1 + a2 + 5e0 = 2
a0 + 2a1 + 4a2 + 0e0 = 0
a0 + 3a1 + 2a2 + 3e0 = 5
a0 + 4a1 + 2a2 + 4e0 = 5
(23)
To find the erroneous private value (or its location) we need to find e0 as follow-
ing, which was explained in section 3.
b0 =
det(A1)
det(A2)
(24)
where
A1 =


1 1 1 2
1 2 4 0
1 3 2 5
1 4 2 5

 (25)
and
A2 =


1 1 1 5
1 2 4 0
1 3 2 3
1 4 2 4

 (26)
After doing the calculation we will have b0 = 4, which means the location of the
error is 3. Because error locator polynomial would be x + b0 = x + 4 and its
root shows the location of the error, and its root in Z7 is 3. Notice that the last
column of A1 and A2 are consisted of a multiplicative factor of parties private
value, so the determinant calculation should be expanded based on that column
and after the expansion players can use any method to calculate the determinant
of the resulting 3× 3 matrix.
12 Secure Error Correction using Multi-Party Computation
References
1. A. Yao, Protocols for Secure Computation, In Proc. 23rd Annual Symp. on Foun-
dations of Computer Science (FOCS), pages 160164. IEEE, 1982.
2. A. Shamir, How to share a secret, Commun. ACM, 22(11):612613, 1979.
3. Liu X, Li S, Liu J, Chen X, Xu G. Secure multiparty computation of a comparison
problem, SpringerPlus, 2016, 5(1):1489. doi:10.1186/s40064-016-3061-0.
4. T. Nishide and K. Ohta, Multiparty computation for interval, equality, and com-
parison without bit-decomposition protocol, in Proc. 2007 PKC, pp. 343-360.
5. I. Damgard, M. Fitzi, E. Kiltz, J.B. Nielsen, and T. Toft, Unconditionally secure
constant-rounds multi-party computation for equality, comparison, bits and expo-
nentiation, Proc. 3rd Theory of Cryptography Conference, LNCS 3876, pp.285-304,
Springer Verlag, 2006.
6. O. Goldreich, S. Micali, and A. Wigderson, How to play any mental game or a
complete theorem for protocols with honest majority, Proc. 19th STOC, pp.218
229, 1987.
7. M. Ben-Or, S. Goldwasser, and A. Wigderson, Completeness theorem for noncryp-
tographic fault-tolerant distributed computation, 20th Annual ACM Symposium on
Theory of Computing, pp.110, 1988.
8. D. Chaum, C. Crepeau, and I. Damgard, Multi-party unconditionally secure proto-
cols, Proc. ACM STOC88, pp.1119, 1988.
9. 21. B. Schoenmakers and P. Tuyls, Efficient binary conversion for Paillier encrypted
values, EUROCRYPT06, LNCS 4004, pp.522537, Springer Verlag, 2006.
10. I. S. Reed and G. Solomon, Polynomial codes over certain finite fields, 1. SIAM,
vol 8, no 2, June 1960, pp 300-304
11. Lloyd R. Welch and Elwyn R. Berlekamp. Error correction for algebraic block
codes, December 30 1986. US Patent 4,633,470.
12. https://math.berkeley.edu/ mhaiman/math55/reed-solomon.pdf
13. M. Nojoumian, D. Stinson, and M. Grainger, Unconditionally secure social se-
cret sharing scheme, IET Information Security, Special Issue on Multi-Agent and
Distributed Information Security 4, 4 (2010), 202-211.
